Charles Krauthammer says it appears Saddam was basing his WMD program on the Japanese model of “just in time” manufacturing:
[R]ather than store large stocks of weapons of mass destruction, he would adapt the program to retain an infrastructure (laboratories, equipment, trained scientists, detailed plans) that could “break out” and ramp up production when needed. The model is Japanese “just in time” manufacturing, where you save on inventory by making and delivering stuff in immediate response to orders. Except that Saddam’s business was toxins, not Toyotas.
Krauthammer adds that the popular impression of weapons inspector David Kay’s report is wrong:
Kay’s list is chilling. It includes a secret network of labs and safe houses within the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi intelligence service; bioorganisms kept in scientists’ homes, including a vial of live botulinum; and my favorite, “new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin” — all “not declared to the U.N.”
I have been to medical school, and I have never heard of Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever. I don’t know one doctor in 100 who has. It is an extremely rare disease, and you can be sure that Saddam was not seeking a cure.
Conclusion: Saddam was in violation of U.N. Resolution 1441. The U.S. enforced it. Case closed.