Media Spinning David Kay’s Report

If you base your opinion of weapons inspector’s David Kay’s report on what you’ve heard or read in the news, you’re not getting the real picture. Kay concludes his report thus:

  1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders
    who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his
    aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass
    destruction.
    Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim
    no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily
    acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever
    the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials
    acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons
    about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make
    available chemical weapons.
  2. In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced,
    but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened,
    would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least
    up to 1000 km
    , well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km.
    These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement
    program about which we have much still to learn.
  3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence
    that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development
    activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service
    . While
    we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities
    of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared
    activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological
    weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

That’s not exactly the same as saying “No Illegal Arms Found in Iraq”, as the New York Times puts it.

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